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Abstract
Internet of things (IoT) that integrate a variety of devices into networks to provide advanced
and intelligent services have to protect user privacy and address attacks such as spoofing
attacks, denial of service attacks, jamming and eavesdropping. In this article, we investigate the
attack model for IoT systems, and review the IoT security solutions based on machine learning
techniques including supervised learning, unsupervised learning and reinforcement learning. We
focus on the machine learning based IoT authentication, access control, secure offloading and
malware detection schemes to protect data privacy. In this article, we discuss the challenges that
need to be addressed to implement these machine learning based security schemes in practical
IoT systems.
Index Terms
IoT security, machine learning, attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) facilitate integration between the physical world and computer com-
munication networks, and applications (apps) such as infrastructure management and environ-
mental monitoring make privacy and security techniques critical for future IoT systems [1]–[3].
Consisting of radio frequency identifications (RFIDs), wireless sensor networks (WSNs), and
cloud computing [4], IoT systems have to protect data privacy and address security issues such
2as spoofing attacks, intrusions, denial of service (DoS) attacks, distributed denial of service
(DDoS) attacks, jamming, eavesdropping, and malwares [5], [6]. For instance, wearable devices
that collect and send the user health data to the connected smartphone have to avoid privacy
information leakage.
It’s generally prohibitive for IoT devices with restricted computation, memory, radio band-
width, and battery resource to execute computational-intensive and latency-sensitive security
tasks especially under heavy data streams [7]. However, most existing security solutions generate
heavy computation and communication load for IoT devices, and outdoor IoT devices such as
cheap sensors with light-weight security protections are usually more vulnerable to attacks than
computer systems. In this article, we investigate the IoT authentication, access control, secure
offloading, and malware detections:
• Authentication helps IoT devices distinguish the source nodes and address the identity based
attacks such as spoofing and Sybil attacks [8].
• Access control prevents unauthorized users to access the IoT resources [9].
• Secure offloading techniques enable IoT devices to use the computation and storage resources
of the servers and edge devices for the computational-intensive and latency-sensitive tasks
[10].
• Malware detection protects IoT devices from privacy leakage, power depletion, and network
performance degradation against malwares such as viruses, worms, and Trojans [11].
With the development of machine learning (ML) and smart attacks, IoT devices have to choose
the defense policy and determine the key parameters in the security protocols for the tradeoff in
the heterogenous and dynamic networks. This task is challenging as an IoT device with restricted
resources usually has difficulty accurately estimating the current network and attack state in time.
For example, the authentication performance of the scheme in [8] is sensitive to the test threshold
3in the hypothesis test, which depends on both the radio propagation model and the spoofing model.
Such information is unavailable for most outdoor sensors, leading to a high false alarm rate or
miss detection rate in the spoofing detection.
Machine learning techniques including supervised learning, unsupervised learning, and rein-
forcement learning (RL) have been widely applied to improve network security, such as authen-
tication, access control, anti-jamming offloading and malware detections [8]–[22].
• Supervised learning techniques such as support vector machine (SVM), naive Bayes, K-
nearest neighbor (K-NN), neural network, deep neural network (DNN) and random forest
can be used to label the network traffic or app traces of IoT devices to build the classification
or regression model [9]. For example, IoT devices can use SVM to detect network intrusion
[9] and spoofing attacks [12], apply K-NN in the network intrusion [13] and malware [14]
detections, and utilize neural network to detect network intrusion [15] and DoS attacks [16].
Naive Bayes can be applied by IoT devices in the intrusion detection [9] and random forest
classifier can be used to detect malwares [14]. IoT devices with sufficient computation and
memory resources can utilize DNN to detect spoofing attacks [23].
• Unsupervised learning does not require labeled data in the supervised learning and investi-
gates the similarity between the unlabeled data to cluster them into different groups [9]. For
example, IoT devices can use multivariate correlation analysis to detect DoS attacks [17]
and apply IGMM in the PHY-layer authentication with privacy protection [18].
• Reinforcement learning techniques such as Q-learning, Dyna-Q, post-decision state (PDS)
[24] and deep Q-network (DQN) [25] enable an IoT device to choose the security protocols
as well as the key parameters against various attacks via trial-and-error [8]. For example,
Q-learning as a model free RL technique has been used to improve the performance of the
authentication [8], anti-jamming offloading [10], [19], [20], and malware detections [11],
4Fig. 1: Illustration of the threat model in Internet of Things.
[21]. IoT devices can apply Dyna-Q in the authentication and malware detections [11], use
PDS to detect malwares [11] and DQN in the anti-jamming transmission [22].
In this article, we briefly review the security and privacy challenges of IoT systems, and
investigate the tradeoff between the security performance such as the spoofing detection accuracy
and the IoT protection overhead such as the computation complexity, communication latency and
energy consumption. We focus on the ML-based authentication, access control, secure offloading,
and malware detections in IoT, and discuss the challenges to implement the ML-based security
approaches in practical IoT systems.
This article is organized as follows. We review the IoT attack model in Section II. We discuss
the machine learning based IoT authentication, access control, secure offloading techniques, and
malware detections in Sections III-VI, respectively. Finally, we conclude this article and discuss
the future work.
II. IOT ATTACK MODEL
Consisting of the things, services, and networks, IoT systems are vulnerable to network attacks,
physical attacks, software attacks and privacy leakage. In this article, we focus on the IoT security
threats as follows.
5• DoS attackers aim to prevent IoT devices from receiving the network and computation
resources [4].
• DDoS attackers with thousands of IP addresses make it more difficult to distinguish the
legitimate IoT device traffic from attack traffic. Distributed IoT devices with light-weight
security protocols are especially vulnerable to DDoS attacks [5].
• Jamming attackers send faked signals to interrupt the ongoing radio transmissions of IoT
devices and further deplete their bandwidth, energy, central processing units (CPUs) and
memory resources of IoT devices or sensors during their failed communication attempts
[22].
• Spoofing: A spoofing node impersonates a legal IoT device with its identity such as the
medium access control (MAC) address and RFID tag to gain illegal access to the IoT system
and can further launch attacks such as DoS and man-in-the-middle attacks [8].
• Man-in-the-middle attack: A Man-in-the-middle attacker sends jamming and spoofing
signals with the goal of secretly monitoring, eavesdropping and altering the private commu-
nication between IoT devices [4].
• Software attacks: Mobile malwares such as Trojans, worms, and virus can result in the
privacy leakage, economic loss, power depletion and network performance degradation of
IoT systems [11].
• Privacy leakage: IoT systems have to protect user privacy during the data caching and
exchange. Some caching owners are curious about the data contents stored on their devices
and analyze and sell such IoT privacy information. Wearable devices that collect user’s
personal information such as location and health information have witness an increased risk
of personal privacy leakage [26].
6TABLE I: ML-based IoT security methods
Attacks Security techniques Machine learning techniques Performance
DoS
Secure IoT offloading
Access control
Nerual network [16]
Multivariate correlation
analysis [17]
Q-learning [21]
Detection accuracy
Root-mean error
Jamming Secure IoT offloading
Q-learning [19], [20]
DQN [22]
Energy Consumption
SINR
Spoofing Authentication
Q-learning [8]
Dyna-Q [8]
SVM [12]
DNN [23]
Distributed Frank-Wolfe [27]
Incremental aggregated
gradient [27]
Average error rate
Detection accuracy
Classification accuracy
False alarm rate
Miss detection rate
Instrusion Access control
Support vector machine [9]
Naive Bayes [9]
K-NN [13]
Neural network [15]
Classification accuracy
False alarm rate
Detection rate
Root mean error
Malware
Malware detection
Access control
Q/Dyna-Q/PDS [11]
Random forest [14]
K-nearest neighbors [14]
Classification accuracy
False positive rate
Ture positive rate
Detection accuracy
Detection latency
Eavesdropping Authentication
Q-learning [10]
Nonparametric Bayesian [18]
Proximity passing rate
Secrecy data rate
III. LEARNING-BASED AUTHENTICATION
Traditional authentication schemes are not always applicable to IoT devices with limited
computation, battery and memory resources to detect identity-based attacks such as spoofing and
Sybil attacks. Physical (PHY)-layer authentication techniques that exploit the spatial decorrelation
of the PHY-layer features of radio channels and transmitters such as the received signal strength
indicators (RSSIs), received signal strength (RSS), the channel impulse responses (CIRs) of the
radio channels, the channel state information (CSI), the MAC address can provide light-weight
security protection for IoT devices with low computation and communication overhead without
leaking user privacy information [8].
PHY-layer authentication methods such as [8] build hypothesis tests to compare the PHY-layer
feature of the message under test with the record of the claimed transmitter. Their authentication
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Fig. 2: Performance of PHY-layer authentication system with different number of antennas at
each landmark.
accuracy depends on the test threshold in the hypothesis test. However, it is challenging for an
IoT device to choose an appropriate test threshold of the authentication due to radio environment
and the unknown spoofing model. As the IoT authentication game can be viewed as a Markov
decision process (MDP), IoT devices can apply RL techniques to determine the key authentication
parameters such as the test threshold without being aware of the network model.
The Q-learning based authentication as proposed in [8] depends on the RSSI of the signals
under test and enables an IoT device to achieve the optimal test threshold and improve the utility
and the authentication accuracy. For example, the Q-learning based authentication reduces the
average authentication error rate by 64.3% to less than 5%, and increases the utility by 14.7%
compared with the PHY-authentication with a fixed threshold in an experiment performed in a
12× 9.5× 3 m3 lab with 12 transmitters [8].
Supervised learning techniques such as Frank-Wolfe (dFW) and incremental aggregated gradi-
ent (IAG) can also be applied in IoT systems to improve the spoofing resistance. For example, the
authentication scheme in [27] applies dFW and IAG and exploits the RSSIs received by multiple
landmarks to reduce the overall communication overhead and improve the spoofing detection
accuracy. As shown in Fig. 2, the average error rate of the dFW-based authentication and the
IAG-based scheme are 6‰ and less than 10−4, respectively, in the simulation with 6 landmarks
8Fig. 3: Illustration of the ML-based authentication in IoT systems.
each equipped with 6 antennas. The dFW-based authentication saves the communication overhead
by 37.4%, while the IAG saves the computation overhead by 71.3 % compared with the FW-based
scheme in this case [27].
Unsupervised learning techniques such as IGMM can be applied in the proximity based
authentication to authenticate the IoT devices in the proximity without leaking the localization
information of the devices. For instance, the authentication scheme as proposed in [18] uses
IGMM, a non-parameteric Bayesian method, to evaluate the RSSIs and the packet arrival time
intervals of the ambient radio signals to detect spoofers outside the proximity range. This scheme
reduces the detection error rate by 20% to 5%, compared with the Euclidean distance based
authentication [18] in the spoofing detection experiments in an indoor environment.
As shown in Fig. 3, this scheme requests the IoT device under test to send the ambient signals
features such as the RSSIs, MAC addresses and packet arrival time internal of the ambient signals
received during a specific time duration. The IoT device extracts and sends the ambient signals
features to the legal receiver. Upon receiving such authentication messages, the receiver applies
9IGMM to compare the reported signal features with those of the ambient signals observed by
itself in the proximity based test. The receiver provides the IoT device passing the authentication
with access to the IoT resources.
Finally, deep learning techniques such as DNN can be applied for IoT devices with sufficient
computation and memory resources to further improve the authentication accuracy. The DNN-
based user authentication as presented in [23] extracts the CSI features of the WiFi signals and
applies DNN to detect spoofing attackers. The spoofing detection accuracy of this scheme is
about 95% and the user identification accuracy is 92.34% [23].
IV. LEARNING-BASED ACCESS CONTROL
It is challenging to design access control for IoT systems in heterogeneous networks with
multiple types of nodes and multi-source data [9]. ML techniques such as SVM, K-NN and
neural network have been used for intrusion detection [15]. For instance, the DoS attack detection
as proposed in [17] uses multivariate correlation analysis to extract the geometrical correlations
between network traffic features. This scheme increases the detection accuracy by 3.05% to 95.2%
compared with the triangle area-based nearest neighbors approach with KDD Cup 99 data set
[17].
IoT devices such as sensors outdoor usually have strict resource and computation constraints
yielding challenges for anomaly intrusion detection techniques usually have degraded detection
performance in IoT system. ML techniques help build light-weight access control protocols to
save energy and extend the lifetime of IoT systems. For example, the outlier detection scheme
as developed in [13] applies K-NN to address the problem of unsupervised outlier detection in
WSNs and offers flexibility to define outliers with reduced energy consumption. This scheme can
save the maximum energy by 61.4% compared with the Centralized scheme with similar average
energy consumption [13].
10
Fig. 4: Illustration of the ML-based offloading.
The multilayer perceptron (MLP) based access control as presented in [16] utilizes the neural
network with two neurons in the hidden layer to train the connection weights of the MLP and
to compute the suspicion factor that indicates whether an IoT device is the victim of DoS
attacks. This scheme utilizes backpropagation (BP) that applies the forward computation and
error backpropagation and particle swarm optimization (PSO) as an evolutionary computation
technique that utilizes particles with adjustable velocities to update the connection weights of
the MLP. The IoT device under test shuts down the MAC layer and PHY-layer functions to save
energy and extend the network life, if the output of the MLP exceeds a threshold.
Supervised learning techniques such as SVM are used to detect multiple types of attacks for
Internet traffic [28] and smart grid [12]. For instance, a light-weight attack detection mechanism
as proposed in [28] uses an SVM-based hierarchical structure to detect the traffic flooding attacks.
In the attack experiment, the dataset collector system gathered SNMP MIB data from the victim
system using SNMP query messages. Experiment results show that this scheme can achieve attack
detection rate over 99.40% and classification accuracy over 99.53%, respectively [28].
V. SECURE IOT OFFLOADING WITH LEARNING
IoT offloading has to address the attacks launched from the PHY-layer or MAC layer attacks,
such as jamming, rogue edge devices, rouge IoT devices, eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle
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attacks and smart attacks [29]. As the future state observed by a IoT device is independent
of the previous states and actions for a given state and offloading strategy in the current time
slot, the mobile offloading strategy chosen by the IoT device in the repeated game with jammers
and interference sources can be viewed as a MDP with finite states [10]. RL techniques can be
used to optimize the offloading policy in dynamic radio environments.
Q-learning, as a model-free RL technique, is convenient to implement with low computation
complexity. For example, IoT devices can utilize the Q-learning based offloading as proposed in
[10] to choose their offloading data rates against jamming and spoofing attacks. As illustrated
in Fig. 4, the IoT device observes the task importance, the received jamming power, the radio
channel bandwidth, the channel gain to formulate its current state, which is the basis to choose the
offloading policy according to the Q-function. The Q-function, which is the expected discounted
long-term reward for each action-state pair and represents the knowledge obtained from the
previous anti-jamming offloading. The Q-values are updated via the iterative Bellman equation
in each time slot according to the current offloading policy, the network state and the utility
received by the IoT device against jamming.
The IoT device evaluates the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of the received
signals, the secrecy capacity, the offloading latency the and energy consumption of the offloading
process and estimates the utility in this time slot. The IoT device applies the ǫ-greedy algorithm
to choose the offloading policy that maximizes its current Q-function with a high probability and
the other policies with a small probability, and thus makes a tradeoff between the exploration
and the exploitation. This scheme reduces the spoofing rate by 50%, and decreases the jamming
rate by 8%, compared with a benchmark strategy as presented in [10].
According to the Q-learning based anti-jamming transmission as proposed in [19], an IoT
device can apply Q-learning to choose the radio channel to access to the cloud or edge device
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without being aware of the jamming and interference model in IoT systems. As shown in 4, the
IoT device observes the center frequency and radio bandwidth of each channel to formulate the
state, and chooses the optimal offloading channel based on the current state and the Q-function.
Upon receiving the computation report, the IoT device evaluates the utility and updates the Q
values. Simulation results in [19] show that this scheme increases the average cumulative reward
by 53.8% compared with the benchmark random channel selection strategy.
Q-learning also helps IoT devices to achieve the optimal sub-band from the radio spectrum
band to resist jamming and interference from other radio devices. As shown in Fig. 4, the IoT
device observes the spectrum occupancy to formulate the state and selects the spectrum band
accordingly. In an experiment against a sweeping jammer and in the presence of 2 wideband
autonomous cognitive radios with 10 sub-bands, this scheme increases the jamming cost by
44.3% compared with the benchmark sub-band selection strategy in [20].
The DQN-based anti-jamming transmission as developed in [22] accelerates the learning speed
for IoT devices with sufficient computation and memory resources to choose the radio frequency
channel. This scheme applies the convolutional neural network to compress the state space for the
large scale networks with a large number of IoT devices and jamming policies in a dynamic IoT
systems and thus increase the SINR of the received signals. This scheme increases the SINR of
the received signals by 8.3% and saves 66.7% of the learning time compared with the Q-learning
scheme in the offloading against jamming attacks [22].
VI. LEARNING-BASED IOT MALWARE DETECTION
IoT devices can apply supervised learning techniques to evaluate the runtime behaviors of
the apps in the malware detection. In the malware detection scheme as developed in [14], an
IoT device uses K-NN and random forest classifiers to build the malware detection model. As
illustrated in Fig. 5, the IoT device filters the TCP packets and selects the features among various
13
Fig. 5: Illustration of the ML-based malware detection.
network features including the frame number and length, labels them and stores these features
in the database. The K-NN based malware detection assigns the network traffic to the class with
the largest number of objects among its K nearest neighbors. The random forest classifier builds
the decision trees with the labeled network traffic to distinguish malwares. According to the
experiments in [14], the true positive rate of the K-NN based malware detection and random
forest based scheme with MalGenome dataset are 99.7% and 99.9%, respectively.
IoT devices can offload app traces to the security servers at the cloud or edge devices to detect
malwares with larger malware database, faster computation speed, larger memories, and more
powerful security services. The optimal proportion of the apps traces to offload depends on the
radio channel state to each edge device and the amount of the generated app traces. RL techniques
can be applied for an IoT device to achieve the optimal offloading policy in a dynamic malware
detection game without being aware of the malware model and the app generation model [11].
In a malware detection scheme as developed in [11], an IoT device can apply the Q-learning to
achieve the optimal offloading rate without knowing the trace generation and the radio bandwidth
model of the neighboring IoT devices. As shown in Fig. 6, the IoT device divides real-time app
14
Fig. 6: Illustration of the ML-based malware detection with offloading.
traces into a number of portions, and observes the user density and radio channel bandwidth to
formulate the current state. The IoT device estimates the detection accuracy gain, the detection
latency and energy consumption to evaluate the utility received in this time slot. This scheme
improves the detection accuracy by 40%, reduces the detection latency by 15%, and increases
the utility of the mobile devices by 47%, compared with the benchmark offloading strategy in
[11] in a network consisting of 100 mobile devices.
The Dyna-Q based malware detection scheme as presented in [11] exploits the Dyna architec-
ture to learn from hypothetical experience and find the optimal offloading strategy. This scheme
utilizes both the real defense experiences and the virtual experiences generated by the Dyna
architecture to improve the learning performance. For instance, this scheme reduces the detection
latency by 30% and increases the accuracy by 18%, compared with the detection with Q-learning
[11].
To address the false virtual experiences of Dyna-Q especially at the beginning of the learning
process, the PDS-based malware detection schemes as developed in [11] utilizes the known radio
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channel model to accelerate the learning speed. This scheme applies the known information
regarding the network, attack and channel models to improve the exploration efficiency and
utilizes Q-learning to study the remaining unknown state space. This scheme increases the
detection accuracy by 25% compared with the Dyna-Q based scheme in a network consisting of
200 mobile devices [11].
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this article, we have identified the IoT attack models and the learning based IoT secu-
rity techniques, including the IoT authentication, access control, malware detections and secure
offloading, which are shown to be promising to protect IoTs. Several challenges have to be
addressed to implement the learning based security techniques in practical IoT systems:
• Partial state observation: Existing RL-based security schemes assume that each learning
agent knows the accurate state and evaluate the immediate reward for each action in time.
In addition, the agent has to tolerant the bad strategies especially at the beginning of the
learning process. However, IoT devices usually have difficulty estimating the network and
attack state accurately, and has to avoid the security disaster due to a bad policy at the
beginning of the learning process. A potential solution is transfer learning [30] that explores
existing defense experiences with data mining to reduce the random exploration, accelerates
the learning speed and decreases the risks of choosing bad defense policies at the beginning
of the learning process. In addition, backup security mechanisms have to be provided to
protect IoT systems from the exploration stage in the learning process.
• Computation and communication overhead: However, many existing ML-based security
schemes have intensive computation and communication costs, and require a large amount of
training data and complicated features extraction process [9]. Therefore, new ML techniques
with low computation and communication overhead such as dFW have to be investigated
16
to enhance security for IoT systems, especially for the scenarios without the cloud-based
servers and edge computing.
• Backup security solutions: The RL-based security methods have to explore the "bad"
security policy that sometimes can cause network disaster for IoT systems at the beginning
stage of learning to achieve the optimal strategy. The intrusion detection schemes based on
unsupervised learning techniques sometimes have miss detection rates that are not negligible
for IoT systems. Supervised and unsupervised learning sometimes fails to detect the attacks
due to oversampling, insufficient training data and bad feature extraction. Therefore, backup
security solutions have to be designed and incorporated with the ML-based security schemes
to provide reliable and secure IoT services.
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